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After more than ten years of congressional debate over repealing the depression era
Glass-Steagall Act, which separated securities and insurance businesses from banking in the
United States, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) on November 12,
1999.1 As a side drama, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board)
won the bank regulator turf war between itself and the U.S. Treasury's Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency (OCC). The GLBA allows only financial holding companies (FHC),
a subset of bank holding companies (BHC) that are regulated by the Board, to engage in
certain important new financial activities, including merchant banking (the ownership of
securities of a company for purposes of ultimate resale). Before the GLBA, a BHC could
essentially own no more than five percent of the voting equity and twenty-five percent of
the total equity of such entities. In addition, the BHC had to be a passive investor. Now, a
FHC can acquire a direct or indirect interest in a business engaged in any kind of trade or
business without any revenue limitations imposed on it. Prior to the passage of the GLBA,
a BHC could operate section 20 affiliates that had revenue limitations on their corporate
securities underwriting activities.
However, the GLBA did not completely dismantle the walls separating commerce and
banking in the United States. The number of nonbank activities that a BHC can engage in
through a FHC has expanded, but many of them may only be conducted in securities
affiliates and nonbank subsidiaries. In addition, the Board has placed aggregate limits on
the amount of merchant banking activities a FHC may engage in that is tied to its Tier 1
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capital. Congress still harbors a concern that if a banking organization is able to engage in
commerce in an unrestricted manner, there will be the risk that certain safeguards provided
solely for the benefit of depository institutions in the United States, such as federal deposit
insurance and access to the Discount Window, will be relied on to engage in financial
activities and subsequently risk the stability of the financial system generally.2 The GLBA
did repeal Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act (Section 20), which prohibited banks from
engaging in securities underwriting.' In addition, section 32 of the Banking Act of 1933
was also repealed, which had prohibited officers, directors, or employees of any corporation
or other partnership primarily engaged in securities underwriting and dealing from serving
at the same time as an officer, director, or employee of a national bank.4
This article will summarize three major changes in U.S. banking and its regulation and
supervision as a result of the GLBA and discuss the regulations that have been issued on
an interim basis to implement these changes. Those three changes are: (1) BHCs that elect
FHC status engaging indirectly and directly in certain financial activities previously pro-
hibited along with new capital requirements to do so, (2) new restrictions on mixing banking
and commerce, and (3) new umbrella supervision by the Board of consolidated FHCs and
functional supervision of financial activities by traditional regulators of those activities.
I. New Financial Activities U.S. Banks May Engage In
A. FHC ELECTION BY U.S. BANKS AND FOREIGN BANKS
Only qualified BHCs may elect to become a FHC and engage in all of the activities on
the GLBA laundry list of financial activities. To be a FHC, all depository institutions con-
trolled by the BHC must be and remain well capitalized and well managed and must have
received no less than a satisfactory Credit Reinvestment Act (CRA) rating in their most
recent CRA examination. Furthermore, the BHC must file with the Board a declaration
that it elects to be a FHC.5 The declaration will become effective within thirty-one days of
its receipt by the Board unless the Board notifies the BHC.6 The same procedure applies
to foreign banks whose banking presence in the United States is through a bank subsidiary.
In addition, foreign banks whose banking presence in the United States is through a branch,
agency, or commercial lending company can also take advantage of the thirty-one-day no-
tification procedure as a result of an amendment to the interim rule regarding FHC elec-
tion.' National banks may also make such an election if they qualify under similar well-
capitalized, well-managed, satisfactory-CRA-rating requirements as adopted by the.OCC.8
In determining if a national bank is well capitalized, it must deduct its equity investment
in financial subsidiaries? Both the Board and the OCC issued interim rules effective March
2. See Chairman Alan Greenspan, Remarks before the Annual Meeting of the American Council on Life
Insurance (Nov. 15, 1999).
3. Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (repealed 1999); and GLBA § 101(a).
4. Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 78 (repealed 1999); and GLBA § 101(b).
5. Bank Holding Companies Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l) (2000); and GLBA § 103(a).
6. Procedures to Become a Financial Holding Company and Guidance Regarding the Initial Monitoring ofAcquisitions
and the Commencement of New Activities by Financial Holding Companies, SR 00-1 (Sup.) (Feb. 8,2000).
7. Amendment to Board of Governors Interim Rule, 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.81 and 225.90-94 (2000) (hereinafter
Amendment to Board Interim Rule].
8. See 12 U.S.C. § 24a; and GLBA § 12 1(a).
9. 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)2(C); and GLBA § 12 1(a).
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11, 2000, establishing procedures to elect FHC status or engage in certain financial activities
through a financial subsidiary that involves self-certification of meeting the well-capitalized,
well-managed requirements.' 0
By granting foreign banks that operate a branch, agency, or commercial lending company
in the United States the right to elect to be a FHC, the GLBA has attempted to level the
playing field for foreign banks active in the U.S. banking market." However, the Board's
interim rule has not been well received by foreign banks, especially those located in the
European Union, who have complained of extraterritorial application of U.S. requirements
regarding capital. In a letter to the Board signed by John Mogg, the European Commis-
sion's director-general for financial services, complaints of adverse discriminatory treatment
against foreign banks were filed. In addition, European officials have rumored that the
European Commission may consider more extreme measures, including taking the United
States to the World Trade Organization (WTO) or imposing retaliatory measures against
U.S. banks operating in Europe, if the Board does not change the standards applied to
foreign banks to meet the FHC election when the interim rule is finalized.,'
The Board's interim rule requires that a foreign bank wishing to elect to become a FHC
meet the same risk-based capital standards as domestic FHCs if its country has adopted the
Capital Accord of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Accord). If the for-
eign bank's home country has not adopted the Basle Accord, the foreign bank must obtain
a prior determination that its capital is otherwise comparable to the capital that would be
required by a U.S. bank. The Board has also imposed a lower leverage ratio on foreign
banks requiring the foreign bank's ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets to be three percent,
rather than the more stringent five percent requirement for U.S. banks. In reducing the
leverage ratio requirement, the Board recognized that foreign banks are likely to engage in
both banking and nonbanking operations abroad that lower their leverage ratio. If a foreign
bank fails to meet the leverage or other capital ratios, it can appeal to the Board for further
consideration. The Board will refer to the management ratings for the U.S. operation of
the foreign bank and the views of the home country supervisor to determine if the foreign
bank is well managed." U.S. and foreign banks started taking advantage of this election to
become a FHC on March 13, 2000, the first business day following the effective date of the
FHC provisions in the GLBA. 14 The list of FHCs is growing, with 420 BHCs electing FHC
status as of October 2000." However, only twenty-six foreign banks, including those located
in Canada and Puerto Rico, have elected FHC status, and, therefore, the European Com-
mission's complaints of discriminatory treatment may have some validity.
10. Board of Governors Interim Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 3,785 (Jan. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Board Interim Rule];
OCC Interim Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 3,157 (Jan. 20, 2000) [hereinafter OCC Interim Rule]. Once finalized, the
Board Interim Rule will amend Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, by adding a subpart I. See also Amendment
to Board Interim Rule, supra note 7, § 225.81(c) (granting foreign banks the use of the same thirty-one-day
notice procedure for FHC election applicable to U.S. BHCs).
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(3); and GLBA§ 141.
12. See Gwen Robinson, EU Protests to US over "Foreign Bank Bias," FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2000, at 4; New
Rules Biased Against Foreign Banks, European Union Complains in Letter to Fed, Bus. NEws ANALYSIS, Mar. 27,
2000.
13. Board Interim Rule, supra note 10, proposed 12 C.F.R. § 225.90; Governor Lawrence H. Meyer, Re-
marks before the American Law Institute and American Bar Association (Feb. 3, 2000).
14. 12 U.S.C. § 24; and GLBA § 161.
15. See http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/fhc.
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The GLBA contains detailed provisions to address situations when a FHC later fails to
maintain the requirements it met to become a FHC. At first, the GLBA calls for the FHC
to agree with the Board to correct conditions. If the failure is not corrected within 180
days, the FHC must either divest control of any bank subsidiary or cease to engage in
financial activities not listed in section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act.' 6 There-
fore, a U.S. banking group cannot take advantage of the right to mix banking and commerce
as a FHC if it fails to keep its banking subsidiaries' vital signs and its capital and management
strong. A nonbank entity that acquires a bank will still have to apply to the Board for its
approval to become a BHC and may simultaneously file its election to be a FHC if it meets
those requirements. 7 After the GLBA has passed its fourth year of enactment, at the end
of 2003, the Board and Treasury will issue a report to Congress that reviews all the financial
activities that have been allowed and disallowed. This report will advise Congress on the
"risks posed by commercial activities of financial holding companies to the safety and sound-
ness of affiliate depository institutions," as well as the effect of the GLBA financial provi-
sions on the levels of consolidation within the U.S. banking market as a result of mergers
and acquisitions among and between large financial entities. 6
What is novel about the GLBA laundry list of financial activities is that a FHC does not
need any prior bank regulatory approval to engage in any of the GLBA laundry list of
financial activities or to acquire a nonbank company that engages in those activities, such
as a registered broker-dealer or investment advisor, assuming the FHC still meets the re-
quirements to elect FHC status. Rather, the FHC must provide the Board with written
notice within thirty calendar days after commencing the activity or acquiring the nonbank
company. 19 As a result, one can expect a lot of merger and acquisition activity in the U.S.
banking market once all the Board and Treasury interim rules regarding merchant banking,
financial activities, FHC election, and capital requirements are finalized. U.S. standards for
merger and acquisition activity are scheduled to change by the end of 2000, which should
prompt this merger activity that is expected to continue for the next couple of years as
investment banks, insurance firms, and securities firms determine how best to take advan-
tage of the financial activities permissible within the FHC structure offered by the GLBA.
B. FINANCIAL SUBSIDIARIES
Under the GLBA, financial subsidiaries, defined as a subsidiary in which a national bank
controls or holds an interest, are given the same rights to engage in the GLBA financial
laundry list of activities except for four important financial activities in which only FHCs
may engage. In addition, the Board granted state-member banks the same rights to establish
financial subsidiaries that national banks have pursuant to an interim rule expected to be
finalized without comment.20 Financial subsidiaries may not engage in: (1) insurance or
annuity underwriting, (2) insurance company portfolio investment, (3) real estate invest-
16. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m)(l)-(4); and GLBA § 103(a). Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act is
enacted at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) and was the original Board laundry list of nonbanking activities that a BHC
could engage in before passage of the GLBA.
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a).
18. 12 U.S.C. § 1843; and GLBA § 103(d).
19. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(6); and GLBA § 103(a).
20. Financial Subsidiaries of State Member Banks, Board Interim Rule, 12 C.F.R. §§ 208.71-75 (2000).
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ment or development, or (4) merchant banking subject to the joint Board-Treasury review
in 2 004.21 Financial subsidiaries may also elect to engage in the remaining financial activities
listed in the GLBA and can do so by filing a certification with the OCC or the Board that
they have met the statutory qualifications. 22 However, financial subsidiaries have the right
to engage in OCC-approved, nonbank activities that national bank operating subsidiaries
have been allowed to engage in subject to conditions specified by the OCC in its prior
orders. At the end of 2004, the Board and Treasury will have joint authority to allow
financial subsidiaries to engage in the full range of merchant banking activities subject to
applicable restrictions.23
C. NEW FINANCIkL ACTIVITIES
For the past ten years, banks in the United States have sought to conduct certain pro-
hibited or restricted activities, such as securities and insurance activities, through merger
or acquisition or through Section 20 subsidiaries. The most obvious example of this trend
is the recent merger of Citibank and Travelers Group to become CitiGroup, with its famous
subsidiary, Salomon Smith Barney. The Board granted its approval for the merger with the
proviso that CitiGroup would have to divest the bank-impermissible securities and insur-
ance activities if, within five years post-merger, U.S. law still prohibited the mixing of
banking and commerce within a BHC.24
U.S. law now allows certain qualifying BHCs and foreign banks, which are treated as
BHCs due to their establishment of a banking subsidiary or their operation of a branch,
agency, or commercial lending company in the United States, to elect FHC status through
which they can engage in certain specified financial activities. In addition, the Board and
Treasury are, by regulation and order, determining jointly other activities "to be financial
in nature or incidental to such financial activity or... complimentary to a financial activity
[that] do[es] not pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository institutions
or the financial system generally."" s Congress provided statutory factors for regulators to
consider in deciding which activities are financial in nature or incidental to such financial
activity.26
The GLBA sets out the following activities as de facto financial in nature but puts re-
straints on how these activities are conducted within the FHC structure. The statutory
GLBA laundry list of financial activities includes: (i) lending, exchanging, transferring,
investing for others, or safeguarding money or securities; (2) acting as principal, agent, or
broker in providing insurance against loss, damage, illness, death, and disability; (3) pro-
viding financial, investment, or economic advisory services, including advising an invest-
ment company (as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940); (4) issuing
or selling instruments representing interests in pools of assets permissible for a bank to
hold directly; (5) underwriting, dealing in, or making a market in securities; (6) engaging
21. 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2)(A)-(B); GLBA § 12 l(a); see also H.R. No. 106-434 at 154 (1999).
22. Id.; see also OCC Interim Rule, supra note 10.
23. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(7)(B); and GLBA § 103(a).
24. Board Order Conditionally Approving the Application Filed by Travelers Group to Become a Bank
Holding Company by Acquiring Citibank and Its Banks and Non-bank Subsidiaries (Sept. 23, 1998), at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/infoletters.
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2)(a)(i); and GLBA § 103(a)(1).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2)(a)(ii); and GLBA § 103(a)(2).
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in any activity that the Board has determined by order or regulation on or before November
11, 1999, to be so closely related to banking to be a proper incident thereto (subject to the
same terms and conditions contained in such order or regulation, unless modified by the
Board); (7) engaging in merchant banking or investment banking activities by acquiring
interests, shares, or assets in other companies through specified securities and insurance
affiliates; and (8) engaging in insurance company portfolio investment. 7
1. Financial Activities Interim Rule
The Board fleshed out the meaning and limits of the laundry list of financial activities in
the GLBA in an interim rule effective on March 11, 2000, with comments accepted until
May 12, 2000.28 In addition to those activities listed in the GLBA, FHCs may also engage
in the following activities that are financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity:
(1) activities listed in 12 C.ER. § 225.28 and identified as activities that were so closely
related to banking as to be a proper incident thereto by the Board; (2) any activity that the
Board determined by order in effect prior to November 19, 1999, to be so closely related
to banking as to be a proper incident thereto; (3) management consulting services on an
advisory basis; (4) operation of a travel agency in connection with the provision of financial
services; and (5) organizing, sponsoring, or managing a mutual fund (with limitations such
as no management control and no FHC fund ownership over twenty-five percent of equity
within one year of sponsorship).29 During Summer 2000, the Board issued a proposed rule
that would allow FHCs to act as "finder" by bringing together buyers and sellers of financial
and nonfinancial products for transactions that the parties would normally negotiate for
themselves. An example of a finder activity includes FHC hosting of an Internet marketplace
consisting of links to the Websites of third-party buyers and sellers3o
A FHC does not need to obtain Board approval to engage in any of the aforementioned
activities but must comply with the GLBA notice procedures within thirty calendar days
after commencing the activity or consummating the acquisition." The Board has requested
comments on what standards should be applied to determine if activities are "complimen-
tary to ... financial activiti[es,]" but the interim rule currently requires the FHC to obtain
prior approval from the Board to conduct such complimentary activity. 2 In addition, the
Board will accept requests for a determination that an activity is financial in nature or
incidental to a financial activity that requires the FHC to provide detailed information about
the activity and why it considers it to be financial in nature or incidental to a financial
activity.33
2. Merchant Banking Regulations
The merchant banking activities conducted by a FHC through its "securities affiliate"
or its insurance affiliate with an investment adviser arm are the subject of a joint regulation
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(A)-M); and GLBA § 103(a). Amendment to Board Interim Rule, supra note 7,
12 C.F.R. §§ 225.170-75, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-7.
28. Board Interim Rule Listing Financial Activities Permissible for FHCs, 12 C.F.R. § 225.85-89 (2000)
[hereinafter Financial Activity Interim Rule].
29. Id. § 225.86. The last three activities listed in the article were activities that BHCs previously could only
pursue abroad pursuant to Regulation K. Id. § 211.
30. Board Proposal on FHC Finder Activities (Aug. 3, 2000).
31. Financial Activity Interim Rule, rspra note 28, § 225.87.
32. Id. § 225.89.
33. See id. § 225.88.
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issued by the Board and Treasury in interim rule form on March 17, 2000. 34 This interim
rule establishes six standards for FHCs engaging in merchant banking. First, a FHC may
only engage in merchant banking activities through its control of a nonbanking subsidiary,
such as its securities affiliate (broker/dealer) or its insurance affiliate with an investment
adviser affiliate. 3 A FHC may not acquire or control merchant banking investments on
behalf of a depository institution or subsidiary of a depository institution. Obviously, this
raises concerns that the barriers between banking and commerce have not been eradicated
at all by the GLBA. This aspect of the interim rule for merchant banking regulation im-
mediately prompted anticompetitive howls from the U.S. banking industry. The Board's
standard response to such complaints is to remind the banking industry of the contagion
risk to the financial system in general if depository institutions engage in risky activities
such as merchant banking. Second, a FHC may not routinely manage or operate a portfolio
company, which is defined as any company or entity that is engaged in an activity that is
not authorized for a FHC under section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act. Management
covers certain situations in which any director, officer, employee, or agent of the FHC
serves as an officer or employee of the portfolio company or otherwise influences or par-
ticipates in the day-to-day operations or management decisions of the portfolio company.
In special circumstances, a FHC is allowed to manage a portfolio company "to address a
material risk to the value or operation of the portfolio company, such as a significant op-
erating loss or loss of senior management. ''36
Third, a FHC may only hold a merchant banking investment for ten years or less, with
the holding period slightly longer for investments in private equity funds, a period of twelve
years. The Board and Treasury will consider requests for extensions of holding periods
under "extraordinary circumstances"; however, there will be penalty charges to the FHC's
Tier 1 capital equal to 100 percent of the carrying value of the investment for doing so."
A private equity fund is defined as a company formed for the purpose of engaging exclusively
in the business of investing in shares and other ownership interests in companies for resale
and that issues equity ownership interests to at least ten investors that are not affiliated with
and are not officers, directors, employees, or principal shareholders of the FHC. In addition,
a private equity fund cannot have more than twenty-five percent of its total equity held,
owned, or controlled directly or indirectly by the FHC or its directors, officers, employees,
or principal shareholders and its initial term cannot be more than twelve years (which may
be extended for an additional three one-year periods with majority fund equity holder
approval). This holding period standard ensures that the FHC is holding the merchant
banking investments for resale only until a point in time when financial gain is assured.
Fourth, a FHC will have to keep within the aggregate limits applied to its merchant
banking activities as set by the Board and Treasury in the interim rule. The aggregate
carrying value of a FHC's merchant banking investments may not exceed either: (a) the
lesser of thirty percent of the FHC's Tier 1 capital or $6 billion, or (b) the lesser of twenty
percent of the FHC's Tier 1 capital or $4 billion excluding interests in private equity funds
from the overall merchant banking investment value. A FHC may exceed these thresholds
34. Board and Treasury Joint Interim Rule on Merchant Banking Activities and Proposed Capital Charge,
12 C.F.R. §§ 225.170-75, 1500.1-.7 (2000) [hereinafter Merchant Banking Interim Rule].
35. See id. § 225.170.
36. Id. § 225.171(d)(i).
37. Id. § 225.172(b)(4).
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with the prior approval of the Board.s Fear prompts these aggregate value limits. The
Board and Treasury are fearful of BHCs' rapid entry into the merchant banking market as
newly elected FHCs, and what that rapid entry might do to the safety and soundness of
depository institutions affiliated with FHCs engaged in merchant banking activities. There-
fore, until these banking agencies have gained experience supervising these activities and
the industry has gained experience with FHCs involved in merchant banking, these aggre-
gate limits are likely to remain.
The fifth standard set in the interim rule for the merchant banking regulations is an
overall requirement that a FHC develop risk-management reporting and record-keeping
policies and systems to monitor the overall merchant banking investment held by the FHC
and the risks that it produces. In addition, these systems must demonstrate a FHC's com-
pliance with the statutory and regulatory provisions regarding these activities. To name just
a few, these policies and systems must be able to monitor and assess the value of each
investment, the value of the aggregate portfolio, and the diversification of the portfolio;
monitor the terms, amounts, and type of transactions and relationships between the FHC
and each company in which the FHC has an interest; and verify the corporate separateness
between the FHC and each company in which the FHC has an interest. In addition, a FHC
must maintain specific records and file annual and quarterly reports with the Board re-
garding its merchant banking investments. 39 The Board will be issuing forms to facilitate
the filing of these reports.
The interim rule for the merchant banking regulations relaxes the GLBA's strict thirty-
day notice requirement for smaller merchant banking investments involving the acquisition
of a company. Instead, a FHC need only file with the Board a notice providing specified
information about a merchant banking investment where both the acquisition represents
in excess of five percent of the voting shares, assets, or ownership interests of the company
and the cost of the investment exceeds the lesser of five percent of the Tier 1 capital of the
FHC or $200 million ° The Board has stated its intent to conduct a review of each FHC's
policies and systems, in particular to review the investment and risk management systems,
shortly after the FHC commences merchant banking activities.
4
'
Lastly, the interim rule for the merchant banking regulations imposes a prohibition on
cross-marketing between FHC-controlled depository institutions and FHC-controlled
portfolio companies and/or private equity firms. 42 Nondepository affiliates of the FHC are
not subject to this cross-marketing prohibition. The interim rule does not define what cross-
marketing is. However, the Board and Treasury have stated that cross-marketing would not
"appear" to cover efforts by an affiliated depository institution to syndicate a loan to a
portfolio company; the purchase by an affiliated depository institution, for its own use, of
products and services of a portfolio company; or the provision of services or extensions of
credit by the depository institution directly to the portfolio company. However, these later
two transactions would be covered by the requirements of sections 23A and 23B of the
38. Id. § 225.173.
39. Id. § 225.174.
40. Id. § 225.175.
41. The Board issued a supervisory letter in August 2000 that explains what Board examiners may look at
both at the FHC level and at the merchant banking level, if necessary. Frameworkfor Financial Holding Company
Supervision (SR 00-13 (SUP) Aug. 15, 2000).
42. 12 C.F.R. § 225.175.
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Federal Reserve Act, as discussed later, if the portfolio company is an affiliate of the de-
pository institution.4 The application of affiliate status to merchant banking investments
controlled by the FHC and cross-marketing prohibitions between the bank affiliates and
others are discussed separately in the section on restrictions remaining on mixing banking
and commerce below.
3. Capital Proposal for Merchant Banking Activities of FHCs
Amid much controversy, the Board issued a proposed rule developed in consultation with
Treasury that would govern the regulatory capital treatment for equity investments in non-
financial companies held by BHCs. This proposed rule was issued at the same time the
Board issued the interim rule for merchant banking regulations on March 17, 2000. The
proposed rule would impose a fifty percent capital requirement on merchant banking in-
vestments and certain similar investments at the holding company level on a consolidated
basis. The Board invited comments on the proposed rule until mid-May 2000, but has not,
as of October 2000, sought to finalize the proposal. Under the proposal, a FHC would be
required to deduct from its regulatory Tier 1 capital an amount equal to fifty percent of
the total carrying value of all merchant banking investments, as reflected on its consolidated
financial statements." This capital charge would apply to all equity instruments and all debt
instruments that are convertible into equity held by the FHC under the merchant banking
provisions of the GLBA and regulations. It would also apply to all loans extended by a
FHC to a portfolio company in which the FHC owns fifteen percent or more of the equity
or ownership interests of the company. Certain loans will be exempted from the capital
charge, such as short-term secured loans for working capital purposes, loans in which at
least fifty percent has been participated by third parties, and loans that are guaranteed by
the U.S. government. In addition, loans from depository institutions under the BHC group
that are fully collateralized and otherwise comply with section 23A of the Federal Reserve
Act will also be exempt from the proposed capital charge. Lastly, there will also be a fifty
percent capital charge for those nonfinancial investment activities conducted by BHCs and
their subsidiaries as well.41
The banking industry expressed its disappointment with this proposal and accused the
Board of taking away any financial liberalization or modernization that was achieved in the
GLBA by imposing such steep capital requirements." In defending its proposal, the Board
has claimed that all depository institutions under BHCs will remain well capitalized on a
consolidated basis even after applying the proposed capital charge to all of the investments
currently made by these companies.47 This begs the question, if BHCs are able to engage
in merchant banking only since March 13, 2000, how can the Board's assessment of BHCs
have any relevance on what the BHCs might like to engage in as FHCs in the merchant
banking arena? In addition, is the proposed regulatory capital charge just another barrier,
in different form from the Glass-Steagall Act, separating banking and commerce?
43. Merchant Banking Interim Rule, supra note 34, at 24 (Explanatory Comments).
44. Id. at 1, 25-26.
45. Id. at 26-28.
46. Dean Anason, Debate over Capital Requirements Delays Merchant Banking, Am. BANKER, Mar. 15, 2000,
at 1.
47. Merchant Banking Interim Rule, supra note 34, at 26.
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In its self-conducted survey, the Board claimed to have found that most firms engaging
in merchant banking activities hold much more capital than their normal regulatory capital
charge for banking assets under the Basle Accord, which translates into an eight percent
minimum capital charge. Overall, the Board perceives merchant banking investments to be
generally riskier, more illiquid, and more volatile than banking assets prompting the fifty
percent capital charge. However, the Board has decided not to apply the proposed capital
charge to investments made by insurance company subsidiaries of FHCs held pursuant to
the GLBA. Moreover, the Board is aware of the opportunities this may present for arbitrage
between an insurance company and its FHC affiliates to avoid the regulatory capital charges
arising out of the FHC's merchant banking activities. The banking industry has been very
active in commenting on the Board's proposal and it is likely that the final rule, after the
interim rule is published and commented on, will take a slightly different form from what
has been described above. However, the regulatory capital charges will be located in section
II.B of appendix A to part 225 to amend clause (v) to state that portfolio investments must
be deducted from the sum of core Tier 1 capital elements in the manner provided in the
final rule. In addition, section II.B would also be amended by adding a new section II.B.5
governing portfolio investments to state the percentage, now set at fifty percent, of the
value of all portfolio investments made by a parent BHC or by its direct or indirect sub-
sidiaries that must be deducted from the consolidated parent banking organization's Tier 1
capital components. 48
II. Restrictions Remaining on Mixing Commerce
and Banking
The GLBA does expand the field of financial activities in which banks may engage but
it requires them to do so as a FHC that involves regulation as a BHC as well. The GLBA
has amended the firewalls that have existed between banks and their affiliates, otherwise
known as sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. These provisions create quan-
titative constraints on bank loans to, and asset purchases from, affiliates and operating
subsidiaries of BHCs and national banks respectively. Section 23A limits (1) the amount of
"covered transactions" between an affiliate and a bank to not more than ten percent of the
capital stock of the bank, and (2) the amount of covered transactions between all affiliates
of a bank and that bank to not more than twenty percent of the capital stock of the bank.49
Section 23B requires that all covered transactions reflect market prices and that they be
collateralized.5o Covered transactions include the following transactions between a bank
and its affiliate: (1) loans or extensions of credit, (2) purchases or investments in securities
issued by an affiliate, (3) repurchase agreements, (4) acceptance of securities issued by an
affiliate as collateral securing a loan or extension of credit, or (5) an issuance of a guarantee,
an acceptance, or letter of credit including an endorsement or standby letter of credit on
behalf of an affiliate.
5
1
The GLBA extends these provisions to the fund flows between banks and the financial
subsidiaries and securities and insurance affiliates in the FHC group. Transactions between
48. Id. at 29.
49. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1)(A) (2000).
50. Id. § 371c-1.
51. Id. § 371c(b)(7).
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banks and financial subsidiaries are deemed affiliate transactions and therefore covered
transactions, and in certain circumstances, transactions between holding companies and the
financial subsidiaries of banks are also considered affiliate transactions. 52 The GLBA spec-
ifies that covered transactions between a bank and any individual financial subsidiary will
not be subject to the cap of ten percent of the bank's capital stock." However, the amount
of covered transactions between a bank and a financial subsidiary will be subject to the
twenty percent aggregate limit on transactions with all affiliates found in section 2 3A(l)(B).
The Board is working on new regulations interpreting sections 23A and 23B to consol-
idate past advice and orders, as well as to exercise the discretion granted to it under the
GLBA. In particular, the GLBA calls for the Board to adopt final rules addressing the
applicability of section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act to derivative transactions between
a bank and its affiliates, as well as to grants of intra-day credit by banks to their affiliates
by May 2001.14 On March 10, 2000, the Board issued an interim rule that requires intra-
day extensions of credit by a bank, thrift, U.S. branch, or agency of a foreign bank to a
securities affiliate engaged in securities underwriting, dealing, or market making pursuant
to the provisions in the GLBA to be on market terms pursuant to section 2 3 B. In addition,
the interim rule applies the limitations found in sections 23A and 23B to certain covered
transactions to foreign banks that have elected FHC status with respect to lending and
securities purchase transactions between a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank and
their U.S. securities affiliates engaged in securities underwriting, dealing, or market making
pursuant to the GLBA.5 These interim rules are designed to fill the gap while the Board
decides how the final regulations called for in GLBA regarding intra-day credit should take
shape.
There are cross-marketing restrictions placed on depository institutions controlled by a
FHC that prohibit them from offering or marketing any product or service of a company
whose activities are conducted or whose shares are owned or controlled by the FHC pur-
suant to a grandfathered activity or to a merchant banking or insurance portfolio investment
activity. In addition, FHC-controlled depository institutions are prohibited from using a
company whose activities are conducted or whose shares are owned or controlled by the
same FHC through its merchant banking activities to market or offer its products or ser-
vices.5 6 However, the GLBA specifically refers to the use of statement inserts or Internet
Websites to market the others' products or services as examples of permissible cross-mar-
keting if the Board determines that it is within the public interest, does not undermine the
separation of banking and commerce, is consistent with safety and soundness of depository
institutions, and does not violate section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amend-
ments of 1970.1
7
The merchant banking regulations, issued jointly by the Board and Treasury as an interim
rule, expressly prohibit cross-marketing between FHC-controlled depository institutions
and FHC-controlled portfolio companies or private equity funds. There is a rebuttable
presumption that a FHC controls a portfolio company if the FHC, directly or indirectly,
52. Id. § 371c(e)(4); and GLBA§ 121(b).
53. Id. § 371c(e)(3); and GLBA § 121(b).
54. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(0(3); and GLBA§ 121(b).
55. Board Interim Rule Regarding Intra-day Credit, 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (2000).
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(5)(A); and GLBA § 103(a).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(5)(B); and GLBA § 103(a).
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owns or controls fifteen percent or more of the equity capital of that company. The same
presumption will apply to private equity funds if a FHC controls or has sponsored and
advises the private equity fund and the fund owns or controls the equity capital of the
company."
Ill. Streamlining Supervision of BHCs
and Functional Regulation
The GLBA's provisions on supervision of FHCs have been nicknamed "Fed-lite" to
emphasize the umbrella supervision that the Board will have over both BHCs, of which
FHCs are a subset, and the reliance on functional regulation of certain subsidiaries and
affiliates of that FHC by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in particular, and by
the State insurance regulators in general, both referred to as "functional regulators." The
GLBA Fed-lite provisions limit the Board's authority to examine, impose capital require-
ments on, or obtain reports from subsidiaries of FHCs that are regulated by the functional
regulators." In addition, the Board may not prescribe regulations or use any of its powers
to restrain or restrict functionally regulated subsidiaries of a BHC unless Board action is
needed to prevent or rectify an unsafe or unsound practice or breach of a fiduciary duty by
such subsidiary that poses a material risk to the soundness of the affiliated depository in-
stitutions or to the domestic or international payment system. 60
The GLBA repeals the exemptions from the definitions of broker and dealer under Fed-
eral securities laws that applied to banks. As a result, banks and their affiliates and subsid-
iaries are subject to the same regulation as all other securities product providers and FHCs
will have to push all their securities underwriting activity into SEC-regulated entities. 6'
However, there is an exemption for certain specific securities activities that banks have
traditionally pursued. These exceptions include trust activities, third-party networking ar-
rangements, bank-eligible securities activities with commercial paper and exempted secu-
rities, employee and shareholder benefit plans, sweep accounts, affiliate transactions, private
placements, safekeeping and custody services, asset-backed securities, derivatives, and
"identified banking products." 62 An identified banking product is: (1) a deposit account,
savings account, or certificate of deposit; (2) a banker's acceptance; (3) a letter of credit
issued or loan made by a bank; (4) a debit account at a bank arising from a credit card or
similar arrangement; (5) a loan participation in which a bank or affiliate participates or that
it owns that is sold to qualified investors or other sophisticated investors; and (6) any swap
agreement including credit and equity swaps, except for equity swaps that are sold directly
to any person other than a qualified investor.63 The banking regulators will continue to
regulate banks' swaps business that falls within the definition of "identified banking prod-
ucts," which include warrants, notes, or options, as well as credit swaps and only equity
swaps with qualified investors (persons and companies with over $25 million in investment
58. Interim Rule Jointly Issued by the Board and Treasury, 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.175, 1500 (2000).
59. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c); and GLBA § 111.
60. 12 U.S.C. § 1848(a); and GLBA § 113. See Framework for Financial Holding Company Supervision, supra
note 41, regarding umbrella regulation of FHC by the Board.
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2000); and GLBA § 201. The SEC is in the process of issuing interim rules
to implement its expanded authority under the Act. More information is available at http://www.sec.gov.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78 c(a)(4)(B)(ix) (2000).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78c; and GLBA § 206.
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(assets). The SEC can regulate bank sales of new hybrid products by rulemaking if the SEC
finds that the new product is a security and that the product is a new "hybrid produc[t]. 64
These changes to U.S. securities regulation will take effect in May 2001.6
Banks that advise mutual funds will be subject to the same regulatory scheme as other
advisers to mutual funds and, therefore, that aspect of a FHC's business will be subject to
the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act.66 Without going
into too much detail, the GLBA preserves and in some respects enhances state regulation
of insurance activities, including acting as the functional regulator for insurance activities
of federally chartered banks.67 However, the GLBA prohibits federally chartered banks and
their subsidiaries from underwriting insurance except for certain authorized products.
6
1
Therefore, the GLBA requires information sharing between all the above-mentioned reg-
ulators to avoid duplicate supervision and excessive regulatory burden on FHCs in partic-
ular. The Board can examine subsidiaries that are functionally regulated only if: (1) the
Board has reasonable cause to believe that the entity is engaged in activities that pose a
material risk to an affiliated depository institution, (2) the Board.determines an examination
is necessary to inform the Board of the risk management systems of the company, or (3) the
Board has reasonable cause to believe the entity is not in compliance with the banking
laws. 69 However, the FHC is required to file quarterly and annual reports on its merchant
banking activities as described in the section above on the interim rule for merchant banking
regulations.
Lastly, under the tide of prudential safeguards, the GLBA gives the Board broad au-
thority, by regulation or order, to impose restrictions or requirements on relationships or
transactions between a depository institution subsidiary and any affiliate of such institution
if the Board finds such action is necessary: (1) to maintain consistency with the purposes of
the GLBA, and other federal law applicable to depository institution subsidiaries of a BHC,
or (2) to prevent an evasion of the above-mentioned laws or to avoid a risk to the safety
and soundness of a depository institution.70 The Board has the same powers with respect
to relationships or transactions between a branch, agency, or commercial lending company
of a foreign bank in the United States and any affiliate in the United States of such foreign
bank.7'
IV. Conclusion
It is still the early days of the newly modernized U.S. banking market in which banks
can act through FHCs to engage in traditional U.S. investment banking, broker-dealer
activities, and insurance activities. The Board has pledged to process the domestic BHC
elections to become FHCs as quickly as possible, but not later than thirty days after the
receipt of the declaration to become a FHC. However, it will only be after all the regulations
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i); and GLBA § 205.
65. 12 U.S.C. § 1828; and GLBA § 209.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(A); and GLBA§ 217.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 6711; and GLBA § 301.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 6712; and GLBA § 302.
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1)(B); and GLBA § 111.
70. 12 U.S.C. § 1828a(b)(1)-(2); GLBA § 114. See Framework for Financial Holding Company Supervision,
supra note 41, regarding umbrella regulation of FHC of the Board.
71. 12 U.S.C. § 1828a(b)(4); and GLBA § 114.
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that are called for in the GLBA are finalized that banks will determine the best organiza-
tional structure in which to deliver their services to the marketplace. We are likely to see
unusual mergers, by U.S. standards, between securities firms and banks, both big and small,
and perhaps the creation of de novo banks to create a FHC headed by the merchant banking
entity. Lastly, if the Board eases the FHC-driven, well-capitalized requirements for foreign
banks as requested, foreign banks in the United States may just show U.S. institutions the
way forward, utilizing the experience many of these foreign banks already have in mixing
banking and commerce.
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